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Abstract
The concept of relative bid privacy in auction is proposed, which
does not conceal the bids, but conceals the link between them and the
corresponding bidders. Relative bid privacy leads to two advantages:
the bidding values can be very precise and any auction rule can be
applied. A new mix network is designed and applied to implement
relative bid privacy efficiently. Two rounds of shuffling are employed
in the mix network, so that fairness can be achieved in the auction
without any trust and relative bid privacy is kept even in abnormal
situations.
1 Introduction
In a sealed-bid auction, each of a few bidders offers a sealed bid for some
merchandise(s) on sale and after the bids are open the bidder(s) offering
the highest bid(s) win the merchandise(s) at a winning price. A sealed-bid
auction is usually composed of four phases. In preparation phase, system
parameters are generated. Next every bidder submits a sealed bid in bid
submission phase. Then in bid opening phase, the bids are opened. Finally
in winning price and winner determination phase, the result of the auction
is determined.
The following properties are often required in sealed-bid auction schemes.
1. Correctness: If every party acts honestly, a correct winning price and
winner(s) are determined according to the auction rules.
2. Confidentiality: Each bid value remains confidential to other bidders
and the auctioneer(s) before bid opening phase starts.
3. Fairness means:
• No bidder has any knowledge of any other bidder’s before the bid
submission phase ends.
• After the bid submission phase ends, no bidder can change his
bid.
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4. Non-repudiation: The winner cannot deny his bid.
5. Robustness: Any malicious behaviour of any party cannot compromise
the system or lead to an incorrect result.
6. Public Verifiability: The validity of the result of the auction can be
publicly verifiable by anyone.
7. Price Flexibility: The biddable prices are not limited to a fixed set of
prices. The bids can be as precise as the bidders like.
8. Rule Flexibility: The auction protocol is independent of the auction
rules. The simplest auction is first bid auction, in which a single item
is on sale and the bidder with the highest bid wins but pays his bidding
price for the item. In a Vickery (second-bid) auction, a single item is
on sale and the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays the second
highest bidding price for the item. In kth bid auction, k − 1 identical
items are on sale, the kth bidding price is the clearing price and bidders
with bids higher than it are winners.
9. Privacy: There are several ways to define the privacy of losing bids. In
our paper only relative bid privacy, namely the unlinkability between
the true identity of bidders and the values of their bids, is achieved.
If no trust on any party is assumed to achieve privacy, the privacy is
the strongest. To obtain strong privacy, the extent of trust must be
reduced to a reasonable level.
It is required that all these properties are achieved in a computationally
and communicationally efficient manner. In this paper, a auction scheme
achieving relative bid privacy is proposed. To hide the link between the bids
and the bidders, a new mix network is designed to realize an anonymous
channel for the bidders to submit and open the bids anonymously. All the
bids are published in plaintext after the bid opening phase, so that any
auction rules can be applied. Moreover, there is no limitation on the values
of the bids and they can be as precise as the bidders require. due to the high
efficiency of the mix network, the proposed auction scheme is very efficient.
2 Background
2.1 Absolute bid privacy and relative bid privacy
Bid privacy is a very important and frequently required property in sealed-
bid auction schemes. It has a great influence on other properties, especially
computational efficiency. Bid privacy may be strong (little or no trust is
needed) or weak (strong trust is needed).
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According to motivation behind it, bid privacy can be classified into
absolute bid privacy and relative bid privacy. There are many motivations
to support this property. The following are the most common two.
1. Bidders want their bidding behaviours to be untraceable. Especially
they do not want their evaluations of items to be collected, which is
a violation of their personal privacy and may violate their benefit in
later auction.
2. Seller should be prevented from knowing the bidding values or their
distribution. Otherwise they may gain some advantage when selling
an identical or similar item in the future.
Absolute bid privacy requires that after the auction is finished
• A bidder knows only his own bidding value, the results (the clear-
ing price and identity of the winner(s)) and information that can be
deduced from them.
• Seller, auctioneers or other parties only know the results and informa-
tion that can be deduced from them.
Obviously, absolute bid privacy can satisfy both of the two requirements
above.
However, in some applications, only the first motivation is required and
the second is not necessary. In this case, only relative bid privacy need be
employed. Relative bid privacy means at the end of the auction, although
the bids are opened and published in plaintext, the only information revealed
from the auction about the link between bidders and their bids is:
• each winner has a bid no less than the winning price;
• each loser has a bid less than the winning price.
Schemes only achieving relative bid privacy inherently However, there must
be an anonymous channel between the bidders and the published plaintext
bids.
2.2 Mix Networks
A mix network shuffles a number of ciphertext inputs, each from a user, to
same number of plaintext outputs, so that
1. the output is a permutation of the plaintexts of the input;
2. the permutation between the inputs and the outputs are unknown, so
that the users cannot be linked to their outputs.
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These two properties are called correctness and privacy. A mix network
obtains robustness if it can still work properly in abnormal situations (e.g.
invalid shuffling found). A mix network is publicly verifiable if its correctness
can be publicly verified. A mix network is usually composed of a few servers,
working in sequence. Each server gets its inputs from the previous server
and permutes them to a set of outputs, which are inputs to the next server.
Since the first mix network proposed by Chaum [6], many mix networks
have been proposed[6, 11, 18, 8, 10, 4, 17, 1, 2, 16, 9]. However, most of
them failed to achieve publicly and efficiently verifiable strong correctness
while maintaining strong privacy.
Park[19] proposed a mix network, which employs two rounds of shuffling.
In the first round, short-term public keys of the users are shuffled and the
servers do not prove correctness of their shuffling. Each user checks that his
public key is among the published results of the first round shuffling and
protests if he fails. In the second round, the users’ inputs signed by their
private keys are shuffled and the outputs are published in plaintext. Again
the servers do not prove correctness of their shuffling, which can be verified
by anyone using signature verification. A cut-and-choose mechanism is used
in the second round to prevent outputs of the mix network from being re-
vealed when a malicious server performs an invalid shuffling. This scheme is
correct and private. However, the cut-and-choose mechanism compromises
its efficiency. The fact that it requires two rounds of shuffling itself does not
matter when it is used in auction to shuffle the bids as two rounds of sub-
mission is necessary to achieve fairness without trust1. However, when used
in auction, the two rounds of shuffling in [19] cannot prevent a user (bidder)
colluding with the servers (auctioneers) from changing his input (bid) during
the second round (in bid submission phase), when he can know the inputs
(bids) of other users (bidders) from the malicious servers (auctioneers).
2.3 Related Work
Most published sealed-bid auction schemes [20, 21, 5, 23, 12, 14, 13, 7, 3]
achieve absolute bid privacy, but cannot achieve strong bid privacy, high
efficiency, rule flexibility or price flexibility. In a word, strong absolute
bid privacy, rule flexibility, computational and communicational efficiency
cannot be achieved simultaneously in the published schemes. So a new idea
was presented: in the bid opening phase to publish the bids in plaintext,
so that rule flexibility and price flexibility can be achieved. This idea was
proposed and implemented by Viswanathan et al [22] and by Mu and Vijay
Varadharajan [15], although this concept was not explicitly defined in their
schemes.
1submission of bid commitments before submission of bids is the only method to achieve
fairness without trust on the auctioneers.
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In [15], it was suggested that pseudonyms distributed by a third party in
the form of its blind signature are used by the bidders to submit their bids
through an anonymous channel. However neither a detailed implementation
(a concrete anonymous channel must be included) of relative bid privacy nor
a comprehensive analysis of efficiency (cost of the anonymous channel must
be included) is provided. So high efficiency, a supposed advantage of relative
bid privacy over absolute bid privacy, was not illustrated convincingly in
these two schemes.
In [22], blind signature was used by a third party to distribute the
pseudonyms too. However, [22] is more advanced in that the anonymous
channel for bid submission was described. It was suggested in [22] that the
pseudonym for a bidder was actually a pair of short-term asymmetric keys
for him. The short-term public key of each bidder is signed by a third party
blindly. Every bidder uses his short-term private key to sign his bid. As the
signature is not forgeable, integrity of the bids can be verified when they are
published in plaintext. As the short-term keys are anonymous, relative bid
privacy is achieved. Although the term mix network was not used, this is in
fact a mix network employing a tag. Although the computational cost of the
anonymous channel was not taken into account in efficiency analysis in [22],
this mix network is efficient. However, this scheme cannot prevent a bidder
from colluding with a server in the mix network to change his bid when it
is sent through the anonymous channel. As the bids can be unsealed by
malicious auctioneers when they are sent through the anonymous channel
(although still in the bid submission phase), fairness is achieved only when
the auctioneers are trusted.
The implicit mix network in [22] is actually very similar to that of
Park[19]. They both employ two rounds. The first round is distribution
of short-term keys. The second round is shuffling of inputs signed by the
short-term keys. Correctness verification is not needed for the servers as
it can be guaranteed by the correctness of signatures. However, neither of
them can provide fairness without trust.
3 Auction with Relative Privacy
A sealed-bid auction scheme is presented in this paper, which achieves rela-
tive bid privacy, robustness, public verifiability, and especially rule flexibility,
price flexibility, high efficiency and fairness without trust. A new efficient
mix network is proposed in this paper to implement the anonymous channel
needed for relative bid privacy.
3.1 A New Mix Network
A new mix network is designed to implement auction with relative bid pri-
vacy. The mix network is not complex and its security is obvious.
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1. Each user Pi chooses an input vi and commit it as ci = H(vi, ri)
where H() is a one-way and collision-resistant hash function and ri is
a random number.
2. All the ci for i = 1, 2, ...n are shuffled and then published on a bulletin
board by a few servers. The servers do not need to prove correctness
of the shuffling. The users can supervise that their commitments are
correctly shuffled and published.
3. Then (vi, ri) for i = 1, 2, ...n are shuffled in a second round and then
published on the bulletin board. Again, the servers do not have to
prove the correctness of shuffling. Anyone can verify that every pub-
lished output is correctly committed to some commitment.
The shuffling can be realized by either decryption chain or re-encryption.
The properties of this mix network is as follows.
1. If the hash function is one-way and collision-resistant and every user
is honest, incorrect shuffling by any malicious server will be detected.
2. It is efficient as no proof of correctness is needed.
3. Privacy can be achieved if at least one server conceals his shuffling.
4. Every user’s commitment is published (anonymously) before any other
user’s input is submitted to the mix network. So, even though a ma-
licious user can collude with a server to change its input (violating
correctness) without being detected, this change is restricted as fol-
lows.
• During the first round of shuffling, the malicious user can collude
with a server to change its commitment, thus actually change its
committed input. However, during the first round of shuffling,
even though he can get collusion from any party but the other
users the malicious user has no information about the other users’
inputs if the hash function is one-way.
• During the second round of shuffling, the malicious user may get
some information about the other users’ inputs if he gets collu-
sion of some parties processing the decryption key(s) of the mix
network. However, if the hash function is collision-resistant he
cannot change his input during the second round as his commit-
ment has been published in the first round.
Therefore, a malicious user cannot change his input according to some
other users’ inputs if those users do not collude with him and the hash
function is one-way and collision-resistant. This is the advantage over
the schemes by Chaum, Park and Viswanathan. This advantage makes
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the proposed mix network especially suitable for auction applications,
as fairness can be guaranteed without any trust.
3.2 The Proposed Auction Scheme
In this section, an auction scheme achieving relative bid privacy is imple-
mented by the new mix network. Any auction rule can be applied. Either
decryption chain or re-encryption can be adopted in the shuffling. In the fol-
lowing, a detailed auction scheme employing ElGamal encryption algorithm
and re-encryption mechanism is described. Let p and q be large primes
where p = 2q+1. If not specified, all the computations take place in G, the
multiplicative cyclic subgroup of Z∗p with order q. Let g be a generator of
G. The auction protocol is realized as follows where there are n bidders Bi
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and m auctioneers Aj for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, who act as the
servers in the mix network.
1. Preparation Phase
A public key y ∈ G is published, while the corresponding private key
x = logg y is shared among the auctioneers by k out of m verifiable
secret sharing. Each Aj gets a share xj while yj = gxj is published for
j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
2. Bid submission phase
• Submitting the bid commitments
Each bidder Bi chooses a bid bi ∈ G and a random value ri ∈ Z∗q .
Each Bi calculates his commitment ci = H(bi, vi) and encrypted
it as ei = (ai, bi) = (gvi , ciyvi) while vi is chosen randomly from
Z∗q . ei for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are submitted to the first server in the
mix network.
• Shuffling the commitments
Inputs to auctioneer Aj are ej−1,i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and his out-
puts are ej,i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n while inputs to the first auctioneer
A1 are e0,i = ei for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Auctioneer Aj performs the
following operations.
– obtains input ej−1,i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n published by Aj−1 on
the bulletin board;
– verifies Aj−1’s signature on his output;
– performs re-encryption ej,i = (aj,i, bj,i) = (gvj,iaj−1,pij(i), y
vj,ibj−1,pi(i))
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n where pij is a random permutation from
{1, 2, . . . , n} to {1, 2, . . . , n};
– signs ej,i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and publishes them on the bulletin
board.
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• Decrypting the commitments
Am’s outputs em,i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are decrypted by the auc-
tioneers. Each auctioneer Aj publishes di,j = a
xj
m,i and proves
logg yj = logam,i di,j for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. This proof of correct de-
cryption can be verified by anybody. If there exist a set S =
{s | 1 ≤ s ≤ n, di,s is correct } with order more than k, ci can
be recovered as ci = bm,i/
∏
s∈S d
us
i,s where us =
∏
l∈S,l 6=s(s− l)/l.
• Checking the shuffled commitments
Every bidder checks that his commitment is among the published
commitments. If a bidder Bi fails in the check, he can protest
by revealing eˆi, cˆi and vˆi. If eˆi = (gvˆi , cˆiyvˆi), eˆi is among the
encrypted commitments and cˆi is not among the shuffled and
decrypted commitments, the shuffling is proved to be incorrect.
In that case, every auctioneer has to prove that he re-encrypt eˆi
correctly by zero knowledge proof of equality of logarithms. Any
auctioneer fails to prove his innocence in the case of incorrect
shuffling is removed. After removal of the malicious auctioneer,
ei for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are re-shuffled (if necessary, a new auctioneer
can replace the malicious auctioneer).
3. Bid opening phase
• Providing the committed bidding values
Each bidder Bi calculates e1i = (a1i, b1i) = (gv1i , biyv1i) and
e2i = (a2i, b2i) = (gv2i , riyv2i) while v1i and v1i are chosen ran-
domly from Z∗q . (e1i, e2i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are submitted to the
first server in the mix network.
• Shuffling the bids
Auctioneer Aj with j > 1 gets (e1j−1,i, e2j−1,i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
from Aj−1 and shuffles them to (e1j,i, e2j,i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n A1
gets (e10,i, e20,i) = (e1i, e2i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n from the bidders
and shuffles them to (e11,i, e21,i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Re-encryption
and permutation in the shuffling are the same as in the first round.
• Decrypting the bids
Am’s outputs (e1m,i, e2m,i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are decrypted by the
auctioneers. Like in the first round, if more than k auctioneers
are honest, bi and ri for i = 1, 2, . . . , n can be recovered correctly.
• Verifying validity of the bids
Suppose (bˆi, rˆi) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are the results of bid decryp-
tion. If H(bˆi, rˆi) is not among the published commitments in the
first round, (bˆi, rˆi) is traced in a reverse direction through the mix
network and every auctioneer is required to reveal his shuffling in
regard to (bˆi, rˆi). Any auctioneer failing to prove his innocence
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is removed from the mix network. If all the auctioneer are inno-
cent, Bi is accused of submitting invalid bid and removed from
the auction. After the malicious party (auctioneer or bidder) is
removed, (e1i, e2i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are re-shuffled (if necessary,
a new auctioneer can replace the malicious auctioneer).
4. Winning price and winner determination phase
The auction rule is applied to the opened bids and the winning price
and the winner’s price (These two prices are different if it is not first bid
auction.). The winner BI has to prove his victory by revealing r1I and
illustrating the winner’s price is encrypted in e1I . If the winner refuses
to cooperate, the auctioneers can trace the winner’s bid through the
mix network (revealing their shuffling in regard to the winner’s bid)
to identify the winner.
4 Analysis of the Scheme
4.1 Security Analysis
The desired properties introduced in Section 2 are satisfied in the proposed
scheme.
1. Satisfaction of correctness is straightforward.
2. In the bid submission phase the bids are sealed by hash function H().
As H() is one-way, any bidder’s bid is kept confidential in the bid
submission phase no matter how many auctioneers and other bidders
conspire against him.
3. As confidentiality is achieved, no bidder has any knowledge of other
bidders’ bids during the bid submission phase. As all the commitments
are published in plaintext in the end of the bid submission phase, no
bidder can change his bid after the bid submission phase ends, if H()
is collision-resistant. So fairness is achieved.
4. As illustrated in Section 3.2, the auctioneers can cooperate to iden-
tify the winner when he refuse to claim the winner’s bid. So, non-
repudiation is achieved.
5. Signature, shuffling and bid decryption can be verified publicly, so the
scheme is publicly verifiable.
6. As illustrated in Section 3.2, incorrect shuffling and invalid bid can
be discovered. After the identified malicious auctioneer or bidder is
removed, the auction can run correctly. So the proposed scheme is
robust.
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7. Every bid is decrypted into plaintext in the bid opening phase, so any
auction rule can be applied and any bidding value can be submitted.
That means rule flexibility and price flexibility are obtained.
8. If at least one auctioneer is honest, the bids cannot be linked to the
bidders and relative bid privacy is achieved. A very slight trust is
needed, so the achieved relative bid privacy is strong.
4.2 Efficiency Analysis
The proposed auction scheme is actually composed of two rounds of shuf-
fling and distributed decryptions of the bids. As the correctness verification
mechanism does not require the auctioneers (servers in the mix network) to
prove the correctness of their shuffling, the scheme is very efficient.
• Two rounds of communication is needed between the bidders and auc-
tioneers.
• Every bidder has to perform three encryptions (the computation of
hash function is negligible compared to public key encryptions), which
costs 6 exponentiations if ElGamal encryption is employed. Each auc-
tioneer has to perform n re-encryptions, which costs 2n exponentia-
tions if ElGamal encryption is employed.
• Each of some auctioneers (participants of distributed decryption) has
to perform 3n distributed decryptions and prove their correctness,
which costs 9n exponentiations if ElGamal encryption is employed.
• A verifier of correctness of the auction only needs to verify the cor-
rectness of distributed decryption by k + 1 auctioneers, which cost
12n(k + 1) exponentiations.
5 Conclusion
A new concept proposed in this paper—relative bid privacy—is implemented
in by employing a new mix network to implement the auction scheme. Rule
flexibility, price flexibility and high efficiency are achieved easily as absolute
bid privacy is not necessary. The achieved relative bid privacy is based on a
slight trust: at least one auctioneer is honest. Correctness, confidentiality,
fairness, non-repudiation and public verifiability are also achieved.
References
[1] M Abe. Mix-networks on permutation net-works. In Asiacrypt 98, pages
258–273, Berlin, 1999. Springer-Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 1716.
10
[2] Masayuki Abe and Fumitaka Hoshino. Remarks on mix-network based
on permutation networks. In Public Key Cryptography 2001, pages 317–
324, Berlin, 2001. Springer-Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science
1992.
[3] Masayuki Abe and Koutarou Suzuki. M+1-st price auction using ho-
momorphic encryption. In Public Key Cryptology 2002, pages 115–124,
Berlin, 2002. Springer-Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol-
ume 2288.
[4] Dan Boneh and Philippe Golle. Almost entirely correct mixing with
applications to voting. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security, pages 68–77, 2002.
[5] Felix Brandt. Secure and private auctions without
auctioneers. In Technical Report FKI-245-02, 2002.
http://wwwbrauer.in.tum.de/∼brandtf/studies.html.
[6] D Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return address and digital
pseudonym. In Communications of the ACM, 24(2), pages 84–88, 1981.
[7] Koji Chida, Kunio Kobayashi, and Hikaru Morita. Efficient sealed-bid
auctions for massive numbers of bidders with lump comparison. In
Information Security, 4th International Conference, ISC 2001, pages
408–419, Berlin, 2001. Springer-Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science Volume 2200.
[8] Philippe Golle, Sheng Zhong, Dan Boneh, Markus Jakobsson, and Ari
Juels. Optimistic mixing for exit-polls. In ASIACRYPT 2002, pages
451–465, Berlin, 2002. Springer-Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science Volume 1592.
[9] Jens Groth. A verifiable secret shuffle of homomorphic encryptions. In
Public Key Cryptography 2003, pages 145–160, Berlin, 2003. Springer-
Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 2567.
[10] Markus Jakobsson, Ari Juels, and Ronald L. Rivest. Making mix nets
robust for electronic voting by randomizsed partial checking. In Pro-
ceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium, San Francisco, CA,
USA, August 5-9, 2002, pages 339–353. USENIX, 2002.
[11] Ari Juels and Markus Jakobsson. An optimally robust hybrid mix
network. In Proc. of the 20th annual ACM Symposium on Principles
of Distributed Computation, pages 284–292. ACM, 2001.
[12] H Kikuchi, Michael Harkavy, and J D Tygar. Multi-round anonymous
auction. In Proceedings of the First IEEE Workshop on Dependable
and Real-Time E-Commerce Systems, pages 62–69, June 1998.
11
[13] Hiroaki Kikuchi. (m+1)st-price auction. In The Fifth International
Conference on Financial Cryptography 2001, pages 291–298, Berlin,
February 2001. Springer-Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume 2339.
[14] Hiroaki Kikuchi, Shinji Hotta, Kensuke Abe, and Shohachiro Nakanishi.
Distributed auction servers resolving winner and winning bid without
revealing privacy of bids. In proc. of International Workshop on Next
Generation Internet (NGITA2000), IEEE, pages 307–312, July 2000.
[15] Yi Mu and Vijay Varadharajan. An internet anonymous auction
scheme. In International Conference on Information Security and Cryp-
tology 2000, pages 171–182, Berlin, 2000. Springer-Verlag. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science Volume 2015.
[16] C. Andrew Neff. A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-
voting. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity 2001, pages 116–125, 2001.
[17] W Ogata, K Kurosawa, K Sako, and K Takatani. Fault tolerant anony-
mous channel. In Proc. of International Conference on Information and
Communication Security 1997, pages 440–444, Berlin, 2000. Springer-
Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 1334.
[18] Miyako Ohkubo and Masayuki Abe. A length-invariant hybrid mix.
In ASIACRYPT 2000, pages 178–191, Berlin, 2000. Springer-Verlag.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 1976.
[19] C. Park, K. Itoh, and K. Kurosawa. Efficient anonymous channel and
all/nothing election scheme. In Tor Helleseth, editor, Advances in Cryp-
tology - EuroCrypt ’93, pages 248–259, Berlin, 1993. Springer-Verlag.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 765.
[20] Kouichi Sakurai and S Miyazaki. A bulletin-board based digital auc-
tion scheme with bidding down strategy -towards anonymous electronic
bidding without anonymous channels nor trusted centers. In Proc. In-
ternational Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce,
pages 180–187, Hong Kong, 1999. City University of Hong Kong Press.
[21] Koutarou Suzuki, Kunio Kobayashi, and Hikaru Morita. Efficient
sealed-bid auction using hash chain. In International Conference on In-
formation Security and Cryptology 2000, pages 183–191, Berlin, 2000.
Springer-Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2015.
[22] Kapali Viswanathan, Colin Boyd, and Ed Dawson. A three phased
schema for sealed bid auction system design. In Information Security
and Privacy, 5th Australasian Conference, ACISP’2000, pages 412–426,
Berlin, 2000. Springer-Verlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1841.
12
[23] Yuji Watanabe and Hideki Imai. Reducing the round complexity of a
sealed-bid auction protocol with an off-line ttp. In STOC 2000, pages
80–86. ACM, 2000.
13
